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vii 
This dissertation examined the theoretical foundations o f 
a n individual's labor force participation decision . Further, 
this dissertation provided empirical analysis of the impact o f 
s tate tax rates, the duration of unemployment, and household 
size on male, female, and combined labor force participation 
rates of the fifty states from 1985 to 1990. Empirical tests 
showed that: 1) no significant relationship existed between 
tax variables and participation rates; 2) the duration of 
unemployment was positively related with participation rates 
while unemployment was negatively related; 3) service sector 
growth was positively correlated with longer durations of 
unemployment; and 4) household size was negatively related 
with female participation, although no significant 
viii 
relationship existed between household size and male 
participation rates. (98 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The decision by individuals to participate in the labor 
force affects household consumption, non-market household 
production of goods and services, leisure, and other 
psychological dimensions which combine to create total 
household utility. This being the case, labor force 
participation decisions are often determined jointly in an 
interdependent process between spouses, wherein one's 
individual utility is partially a function of the utility of 
those with whom he/she lives (Altug and Miller, 1990; Blau and 
Grossberg, 1991; Chiappori, 1988; Coyte, 1986; Eaton and 
Quandt, 1983; Edwards, 1989; Felder, 1988; Gould and Saupe, 
1989; Hausman and Ruud, 1984; Kaufman, 1989; Keeley, 1981; 
MaCurdy et al., 1990; Tokle and Huffman, 1991). 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a general 
theoretical basis for the labor force participation decision. 
The following discussion shows that participation decisions 
are derived from individual utility functions, and are related 
to the market hours decision. 
A. The Theoretical Basis of Participation 
Using a specific example, the ith individual within a 
household maximizes his or her utility: 
2 
(1) 
v/he re 1 ; is leisure time, C; is the value of the individual's 
c onsumption, and Uj is the utility of the jth person(s) in the 
household. Including the utility of the jth person forces 
interdependence of utility among family members. 
Leisure time within the utility function is simply 
defined as : 
(2) 
where T is total time available, Tw is time spent in wage 
earning, and TiHP is time spent in individual non-wage 
household production of goods and services, noting that some 
of 1; and TiHP may be time spent jointly with other household 
members. 
Individual consumption, C;, is composed of purchased 
g oods and services, xi' and the money value of goods and 
s ervices produced by the household, Z;· The value of C; can 
be expressed as: 
(3) 
where P is the price of consumer goods and services. The 
value of Z; is assumed to be equal to the opportunity costs 
(disposable wages forgone) associated with the hours spent on 
household production, Z;= W; 'TiHP' where prime values indicate 
disposable wages and income. The va lue of household 
production of goods and services can be expressed as: 
3 
(4) 
which implies that z = Z; + zj. 
A production constraint is imposed on (4) through the 
time identity in (2). A budget constraint is imposed on 
consumption of X; in that 
(5) 
where Yd is the disposable income of the househo ld, S is 
househo ld saving, and Cpj is purchased consumption by the jth 
person(s ) . 
The time constraint is directly tied to a budget 
constraint 
(6) 
whe re disposable household income depends directly on the time 
a llocated to market hours by the ith and jth persons, the 
respective wages of these persons (w; and wj ), transfers (Y,r), 
asset income (Y.), and taxes. Asset income in time period t 
can be expressed as 
(7) 
where c. is consumption of wealth, which can be assumed t o be 
a function of unemployment, position in life-cyc le, and 
duration of unemployment. The risk-free component of the 
i nteres t rate (r) is typically determined by the Treasury when 
it issues short - term securities, and is therefore exogenous. 
4 
The remainder of the interest rate is a function of the 
relative risk involved in the household asset portfolio. 
Totally differentiating the dependent variables with 
respect to all related variables yields: 
( from (1) ) : 
(8) 
(from (2)): 
(9) 
(from (3)): 
(10) 
(from (4)): 
(11) 
Totally differentiating the ith individual's share of 
consumption of purchased goods (from (5)) yields: 
(12) ac ac ac d(C )-(~)dY +(~)dS+(~)dC . p, ayd d as acpj PJ 
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whi c h is directly related to the total differential of 
d ispo sable income (from (6)): 
( 13) 
where transfer income (Ytr) can include Social Security and 
public or private welfare payments. The total differenti a l 
o f as s et income (from (7)) is: 
(14) 
aY. aY. 
dY.- ( ~) dY. ,,_, + (--as-- ) dS <t-ll 
d ( e-l) ( t - 1) 
ay ay ay 
+(-a •)dC.+ ( -a•)dr+(-a( a) )d(Tax) 
c. r Tax 
The hypothesized signs of the partial derivatives listed 
in total differentials (8) to (14) are: 
from (8): au/al;<=>o; au/ac; >o; au/auj> o; 
from (9) : a1/aT;.<o; 
from (10): ac/aP<o; ac/ ax;>o; ac/az; >o; 
from (11) : az;aTiHP>O; az;aTjHP>O; az;aw;>O; 
az;awj>o; 
from ( 12) : acp/aYd>o; acp/as<o; acp/acpj <o; 
from ( 13): av~aT;w>o; av~aw;>o; av~aTjw> o; 
avd;awj>o; av~aY">o; ay~aY.> o; 
av~aTax< O; 
from (14): av.;ava<t-1J>o; av.;as,_,>o; av.;ac.<o; 
av.;ar>o; av.;aTax<O . 
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The question now becomes, at what point do individuals 
within a household enter the work force? The answer depends 
on the individual reservation wage , which is defined as the 
expected wage that increases the individual's time allocated 
to the market (T;wl from zero to some infinitesimal value 
greater than zero. The reservation wage is the marginal rate 
of substitution between cpi and li cacp/a l ;) ' where l i -+ 1 ;* , 
and 1 ;* is equal to T - (TiHP• + T;;). 
Optimal leisure time (l;*) is found by maximizing 
ind ividual utili ty in equation (1) , subject to budget and time 
constra ints. The time and money constraints can be expressed 
in a single full-income equation as 
(15) F-w~l i +PXi+ ~TiHP+wjl i +Pxj+wjTjHP 
- (w~+wj) T+Y~. 
Where prime values are net of taxes, this i mplies that the 
expenditures on goods and services plus expenditures on 
leisure plus the value of household production are equal to 
the total value of time for the ith and jth persons , plus non -
wage income. 
Assuming that the utility of the jth person(s) in 
equation (1) is symmetrical to the specification presented for 
the ith person(s), the optimization problem becomes 
7 
The first order condi t ions fr om this La gra ngian, assuming an 
interior solution and so l ving for A, are 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
aui + aui !!:!J_ 
aP au1 aP -A 
xi+xJ 
aui + aui au1 
axi au1 axi -A 
p 
8 
(24) 
(25) 
and 
(26) 
where A is the marginal utility of full income. 
Given these first-order conditions, we can solve for the 
ith individual's reservation wage through the first partial of 
the Lagrangian with respect to leisure, where 1; = T', and T' 
= T - T iHP * 
(27) 
aui + aui auj 
1 ar; au; ar; 1,-r' 
;.. 
By manipulating this optimization problem, we can derive 
opt imal market hours, saving and non-wage income from optimal 
consumption, leisure, and household production. All of these 
values can be combined to express optimal values of 
consumption as 
(28) Pxl - ( (T;,.wj +Tj,.wj) +Y~1 ) -S"-Pxj, 
9 
where the ith person's optimal consumption of purchased goods 
depends directly on the optimal market hours and disposable 
wa ge o f the ith and jth persons, optimal non-wage dispos a b l e 
i ncome, optimal saving, and the jth person's optimal 
c onsumptio n of purchased goods. Solving (28) for T. y ields : 
(29) 
The total differential of equation (29) becomes: 
(30) 
• ar;w 1 ar;.., ar;w • aTlw • dTi w· ( -- ) dwi+ ( -a- ) dP+ ( --) dxi + ( -- ) dTi w 
aw; p ax; ar;w 
+ ( arjw) dw'+ ( aTjw ) dY"' + ( aTjw ) dS*+ ( arjw) dx :. 
aw~ ) av~' n as· ax; ) 
where aT ;; ; aw;' <=> o . Further, the signs of the remaining 
partial derivatives are: 
aTiw*;acP;" > O; 
aTiw*/aTiw* < 0; 
aT ;; ; aw; • < o; 
aTiw*;as* > 0; 
aTiw•;acP;" > 0. 
As stated above, if Tiw• > 0, then the ith person is in 
the labor force. It is important to note that T;w* is the 
amount of time supplied to the market. Whether or not the 
person is actually employed is irrelevant to the question of 
participation. However, influences on the initial increment 
of market time provided as the expected wage rises above the 
reservation wage can be show in a Slutsky decomposition. 
The system of equations provided above implies that 
market hours are a function of wages and the full income 
10 
definition provided in (15) , so that Tiw = f(w; ', wj ' , Yn ' ) . 
The Slutsky is derived directly as a total differential of 
this expression 
(31) 
which shows that the total change i n ma rket hours is composed 
of the own- wage compensated substitution effect plus the 
c ross - wage compensated substitution effect, plus the full 
income effect (Keeley, 1981). It is important t o note that 
changes in the jth person's wages enter into the ith person's 
budget constraint as a change in non-wage income (private 
transfer payments) . This occurs because of the pooling of 
income that occurs in households . 
As was shown above in (30), the first partial derivative 
of Tiw with respect to Yn' is negative. We must also assume 
that the sign of the utility held constant (compensated) first 
partial derivative of T;w with respect to W; ' is positive, and 
that wage income of the jth person is equal to zero. Further, 
we can now define Yn' as Y0 ' + Yt, or, net asset income plus 
transfers (public and private). 
B. Conclusion 
The participation decision, while related to the market 
hours decision, is really quite simple in general terms. 
Participation will occur when the expected wage is greater 
11 
than the reservation wage. If the reservation wage falls for 
a ny reason, and the expected wage remains constant, then the 
l ikelihood of participat ion rises, or vice versa . 
The following chapters provide a more specific analysis 
of the participation decision under a variety of 
circumstances. Chapter II provides an empirical analysis of 
the correlation of state taxes with labor force participation 
utilizing panel data. Chapter III provides an empirical 
analysis of the correlation of unemployment rates and the 
duration of unemployment with variations in participation 
rates. Chapter IV provides an empirical analysis of the 
correlation between household size and the participation 
decision. Chapter V provides a brief summary of the findings 
from each of the preceding chapters. 
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CHAPTER II 
A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
STATE TAXES AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
RATES WITH AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
14 
Much research has been done to discover how taxes affect 
the labor decisions of households . Initial theoretical works 
by Milton Friedman (1949, 1976) and the general equilibrium 
approach taken by Gwartney and Stroup (1983) show that when 
tax revenues flow back to the household in the form of 
transfers, there is only a compensated substitution effect. 
There is no income effect in thi s case because the tax payment 
is added back into household income as a non-wage public 
transfer of income. 
Assuming for the moment that public sector spending is 
perceived by a representative individual in the aggregate 
economy as a dollar-for-dollar offset to taxes paid, we can 
show the change in work hours and labor force participation 
with the following graph. In the case of increasing taxes, 
the expected wage falls from w to w 1 as non-wage income 
increases from Yn to Yn 1 , which increases the reservation wage. 
The net result is that market hours fall from Tiw to Tiw 1 • 
Further, the probability of labor force participation in the 
aggregate falls due to converging expected and reservation 
wages (see Figure 1) . This of course assumes that gross real 
1 5 
wages and gross real asset income are held constant, and that 
the economy remains on a given production possibilities 
frontier. 
y \ 
( 
y 
T.' 
1W 
0 
FIGURE 1. NON-WAGE INCOME COMPENSATION FOR REDUCED 
WAGES IN THE PRESENCE OF TAXES 
n 
Other authors (Hausman and Ruud, 1984; Triest, 1990) have 
empirically ana lyzed the effect of taxes on the labor hours 
supplied by men and women . Hausman and Ruud found that the 
elasticity associated with net wages was . 26 for men and .32 
for women. 
1 6 
These low elasticity values were verified by 
Tries t who estimated unc ompensated wage elasticitie s for men 
bet wee n - . 02 and . 06, and uncompensated elastic ities for 
women b e t ween .03 and .28, depending on the method used. 
These low wage elasticities are taken to mean that as net 
wages f a ll due to increasing taxes, there must be an income 
ef f e ct which counters the dominating substitution effect 
hypothesi z ed by Friedman and others. Blomquist (198 8) 
s uggest s that the reason empirical researchers are deriving 
such l ow net wage elasticities is that they fail to account 
fo r the nonlinearity of the tax structure. Blomquist argues 
that nonlinear tax rates shift the supply curves of different 
income earning groups, and that the net result is an empirical 
estimatio n which is misleading and far less elastic than it 
s hould be. 
On the other hand, Macurdy et al. (1990) argue that 
s tudies which account for nonlinear taxes using a piecewise 
budget set in a maximum likelihood model will typically 
generate larger substitution and lower income elasticities 
than with other methods. These authors suggest that this 
result is not due to theory but the implicit assumptions 
involved in using maximum likelihood methods (i.e., forcing 
Slutsky conditions and inequality restrictions on Slutsky 
terms). 
In summary, reviewing the literature does little to 
c larify the issue of how taxes affect the labor decisions of 
17 
households. However , in all of these studies, the point of 
a ttack or defense is related to the relative size of the 
i ncome and substi tution effects associated with the imposition 
o f taxes on income, which is directly related to the extent to 
which tax payments flow back as transfers. 
A. Theoretical Explanation of the Impact of Taxes 
on Labor supply Decisions 
We can generalize the impact of t axes on participation 
ra tes a nd work hours by maxim i zing a typical interdependent 
utility function . From this maximization process, we can 
create a Slutsky decomposi tion of the influences on market 
hours, and therefore participation. 
The i th individual in a household maximizes the utility 
function: 
(l) 
where l; is leisure time, C; is the va lue of the individual's 
consumption, a nd Ui is the utility of the jth person(s) in the 
househ o ld. Including the utility of the j th person forces 
interdependence of utility between family members. 
Leisure time within the utility func t ion is simply 
defined as: 
(2) 
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where T is total time avai lable, Tw is time spent in wage 
earning, and T 1 ~ is time spent in individual non-wage 
household product i on of goods and services, noting that some 
of 1 1 and T1,P may b e time spent jointly with other household 
members. 
Individual consumption, c 1 , is composed of purchased 
goods and services, x 1 , and the money value of goods and 
services produced by the household, Z1 • 
be expressed as: 
(3) 
The value of c1 can 
where P is the price of consumer goods and services. The 
va lue of Z1 is assumed to be equal to the opportunity costs 
(disposab l e wages forgone) associated with the hours spent on 
household production, z 1= w1 'TiHP' where prime values indicate 
d isposable wages and income. The value of household 
production of goods and services can be expressed as : 
(4) 
which implies that Z = z 1 + Z j. 
A production constraint is imposed on (4) through the 
time identity in (2). A budget constraint is imposed on 
consumption of x 1 in that 
(5) 
19 
whe re Yd is the disposable income of the household, s is 
household saving, and CPi is purchased consumption by the jth 
person(s). 
The time constraint is directly tied to a budget 
constraint 
(6) 
where disposable household income depends directly o n the time 
allocated to market hours by the ith and jth persons, the 
respective wages of these persons (wi and wi ), transfers (Ytr), 
asset income (Y.), and t axes . Asset income in time period t 
can be expressed as 
(7) 
where c. is consumption of wea lth, which can be assumed to be 
a function of unempl oyment, position in life-cycle, and 
duration of unemployment. The risk-free component of the 
i nterest rate (r) is typically determined by the Treasury when 
it issues short-term securities, and is therefore exogenous. 
The remainder of the interest rate is a function of the 
re lative risk involved in the household asset portfolio. 
Optimal leisure, market, and household produc tion time 
can be found b y maximizing individual utility in equat ion (l), 
subject to budget and time constraints. A full description of 
the optimization problem is not required here, rather, 
attention must be focused on the factors which may change 
optimal market hours from zero. A Slutsky decomposition is 
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created below to show the hypothesized impact of changing 
monetary facto rs and competing time uses. 
The time and money constraints can be expressed in a 
singl e full-income equation as 
(8) F-w~l i +~T1 w+w~TiHP+wjl 1+wjTjw+wjTjHP 
- ( W~+w;) T+ Y~ . 
Where prime values are net of taxes, this implies that the 
expenditures on goods (the value of market time by the ith and 
jth persons) plus expenditures on leisure plus the value of 
household production are equal to the total value of time for 
the ith and jth persons, plus non-wage income. Therefore, the 
system of equations provided above implies that market, 
le isure , and household production hours are a functi on of 
wages and non-wage income, so that T;w = f (w; 1 , w; 1 , Y0 1 ) • The 
Slutsky is derived directly as a total differential of this 
expression 
(9) 
which shows that the total change in market hours is composed 
of the own-wage compensated substitution effect plus the 
cross-wage compensated substitution effect, plus the full 
income effect (Keeley, 1981). It is important to understand 
at this point that wages of the jth person change the budget 
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constraint of the ith person through non-wage income (private 
transfers) . 
The first partial derivative of 'l" ;w with respec t to Y
0 
1 is 
negative . We must also assume that the sign of the utility 
held constant (compensated) first partial derivative of Tiw 
with respect to W; 1 is positive. We can now define Y
0
1 as 
Y• 1 + Y, , or, net asset income plus transfers (public and 
private), which are assumed to be non-taxable. 
If we impose an income tax which does not discriminate 
bet ween wage and non-wage income, then both non-wage income 
and wages are reduced, assuming there is no perceived 
offsetting transfer. Altering the wage alone implies both an 
income and substitution effect. The actual impact on hours 
worked due to the change in the net wage wi ll depend on the 
relative dominance of the income or substitution effect, 
assuming no offsetting increase in transfers. Changes in non-
wage income alone wil l only cause an income effect . 
Therefore , the net impact on market hours due to a simple 
income tax depends on the relative strength of the 
substitution effect due to a change in wage rates, and the 
income effects due to changes in asset income and wages. 
The regions of substitution or income effect dominance of 
changing the wage rate alone can be shown best graphically, by 
assuming a two-dimensional indifference mapping (Figure 2) 
betwe en leisure time (1;) and disposable income (Yd), where 
market time of the jth per,;on is zero. We can assume a 
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consta nt lev el of nonwage income (Yn) if no pe r c eiv ed 
transfers occur. 
w* 
\ 
T iw 
------· f~T-~ Income Ef fec t 
Dominance 
------~-~~~-Substitution 
0 
Effec t 
Dominan c e 
FIGURE 2. REGIONS OF DOMINANT INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION 
EFFECTS DUE TO CHANGING WAGE RATES 
Note that as the net wage is reduce d from near-infinity, 
market hours rise to a positive maximum at Tiw• and then begin 
to fall toward zero, where the expected net wage is equal to 
the reservation wage. Where wages are inversely related to 
work hours, the income effect is dominant over the income 
e ffect. Where wages are directly related to work hours, the 
substitution effect is dominant over the income effect. 
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As stated earlier, changes in non-wage income will only 
cause an income effect. Given this information, if a 
part icula r household faces a ten percent effective tax rate, 
then both wi and Ya are reduced by ten percent, causing both 
a downward rotation and downward shift of the budget 
constraint. 
If we assume that the indifference set, asset income, and 
expected wage are for a representative individual in a 
particular state, then it will be true that a distribution 
e xists a round the representative reservation wage, expected 
wage, and asset income. Given this, the probability of labor 
force participation can be expressed as 
(lO) p (LFP ) -f(wage) -g(a(Yn)), 
where f(wage) is the distribution of mean - normalized real 
wages and g(a(Yn)) is the distribution of mean-normalized 
reservation wages which are a function of non-wage income. As 
the distribution of asset income falls, the distribution of 
no rmalized reservation wages also falls . Therefore, if the 
distribution of wages falls more than the distribution of 
reservation wages, then the probability of labor force 
participation will fall as the distributions converge . It is 
important to note that it is the absolute change in the 
d istribution of normalized wages and reservation wages, not 
the percentage change, which determines changes in the 
participation decision. A measure of absolute normalized 
change for any distribution of x is 
(11) ,l ( f ( X )) _ (Xi(C· li -XIC· O) ) 
X IC· OI 
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If the distribution of reservation wages falls more than 
the distribution of wages, then aggregate participation rates 
will rise as the distance between their respective mean values 
increase. Predicting whether market hours will rise or fall 
in these circumstances depends on whether the new after-tax 
wage is above or below the market-hours maximizing (optimal) 
net wage. If the new after-tax wage is above the optimal net 
wage, market hours wi ll increase, or vice versa. 
Changing the mean va lue of after-tax non-wage income, 
ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of expected 
after-tax wages. Changing the mean va lue of expected after-
tax wages, ceteris paribus, traces out the distribution of 
reservation wages, which are a function of after-tax non-wage 
income. Changing either non-wage income or wages under 
ceteris paribus conditions causes changes in the labor force 
participat ion rate in exactly opposite ways. Figure 3 below 
shows the change in the aggregate labor force participation 
rate as a function of the change in the mean after-tax 
expected wage, assuming there is no overlap in either of the 
distributions at the origin. 
dLFPR 
FIGURE 3. CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER-TAX EXPECTED WAGE 
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Figure 4 below shows the change in the aggregate labor 
force participation rate as a function of the change in mean 
a fter-tax non-wage income, once again assuming there is no 
overlap between these distributions at the origin. 
dLFPR 
FIGURE 4. CHANGE IN AGGREGATE LFPR AS A FUNCTION OF 
CHANGE IN MEAN AFTER-TAX NON-WAGE INCOME 
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From a policy standpoint, if we impose an asset-income 
tax, market hours and participation rates will alway s rise, 
ceteris paribus. If a wage tax is imposed and after-tax wages 
a r e a bove the optimal wage, market hours will rise while 
participation rates fall. 
If wages and asset income are simultaneously taxed at the 
same rate , the effect on participation rates may be directly 
o r inversely related to changes in market hours, depending on 
the after-tax values of non-wage income and the expected wage. 
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If we make the assumption that the majority of households 
within a particular state have high asset income and moderate 
wages, imposing a tax which affects all income sources at the 
same rate will cause the distribution of wages to fall less 
than the distribution of reservation wages in absolute terms. 
Ma rket hours, therefore, may fall while participation 
rates rise . However, if we selectively tax households which 
have high non-wage income and expected after-tax wages above 
the optimum wage, then it is likely that market hours will 
rise while participation rates may rise, fall or remain 
constant, depending on the absolute magnitude of changes in 
the expected wage and non-wage income. 
To summarize, the problem of predicting participation 
rates, and how those rates are correlated with work hours, 
breaks down to an analysis of the normalized absolute change 
in reservation wages and expected wages, and whether the 
after-tax expected wage is above or below the optimum wage. 
A high change in non-wage income and a low change in expected 
wages, for example, would be caused by applying a single tax 
rate against income that is composed mainly of non-wage 
income, with relatively low wage income. Possible 
combinations of these variables and the predicted signs are 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
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TABLE 1--THE EFFECT OF INCREASING A UNIFORM INCOME TAX ON 
MARKET HOURS AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, 
BY INCOME TYPE AND LEVEL* 
Hypothesized 
Change in: Position of Effect on: 
Yn Wage After-Tax Wage Market Hours Participation 
High High w > w * + + or -
High Low w > w * + + 
Low High > * + w w 
Low Low w > w * + + or -
High High w < w * + or - + or -
High Low w < w * + or - + 
Low High w < w * 
Low Low w * < w + or - + or -
Assuming Constant Indifference Set and Linear Taxes. 
As shown above, there are only two cases when 
participation rates and hours worked are directly correlated 
(Low/High, w < w*; High/Low, w > w*), and one case where there 
is an inverse relationship (Low/High, w > w*). 
The impact of a combined wage and asset income tax on 
market hours for a representative individual can be shown 
using the three-dimensional offer surface provided in Figure 
5. This representation shows market hours provided due to all 
possible combinations of after-tax wages and non-wage income, 
with the restriction that disposable non-wage income must be 
greater than zero. 
I Yn 
w' 
Reservation 
Wage 
FIGURE 5. MARKET HOURS OFFER SURFACE 
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Moving from point A to point B causes a reduction in the 
after-tax wage and non-wage income, but increases the number 
of market hours. Further, it appears that the absolute 
reduction in non-wage income is greater than the absolute 
reduction in the wage; therefore, we may assume that 
participation rates will increase as well. 
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B. Structural Model Development 
The preceding theoretical discussion showed that if tax 
payments do not completely flow back to households as 
perceived public transfers, multiple combinations of effects 
on participation rates and work hours are possible. As 
mentioned earlier, a simple test of whether representative 
households perceive that tax revenues are flowing back to them 
in the form of transfers is to examine variations in 
participation rates in the presence of different tax rates, 
control ling for changes in real income and other demographic 
variables. 
A basic model to explain labor force participation can be 
developed by acknowledging that the reservation wage is a 
function of average non-wage income, which can be simply 
defined as the average transfer payment plus average asset 
income. Further, the expected wage for the representative 
individual is the average wage, conditioned by the probability 
of receiving that wage. The probability of receiving a given 
wage can be defined as one minus the unemployment rate . The 
discussion above assumes that the indifference set remains 
cons tant in shape and placement. 
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The st ruc tural model becomes 
(12) LFPR-p(E( w) , wr), 
(13) E(w)-(1-UN)w, 
(14) 
Given that this model is for a representative (average) 
ind i v idual, there exists a distribution around both the 
reserva tion and e xpected wages. Therefore, as these mean 
va lues s tart to converge , we would expect to observe greater 
overlap in their respective distributions, thus caus ing 
observed aggregate participation rates to fall. 
As stated earlier, if one rejects the notion that only a 
compensated substitution effect exists, then predic ting the 
c hange in participation rates due to taxes becomes somewhat 
more d ifficult. If the tax is structured in such a way that 
it reduces asset income more than wages, then participation 
ra t es may rise as taxes are imposed. Further, if the tax 
maintains the difference between the reservation wage and the 
expected wage, albeit at lower levels for both, then 
parti c ipation rates should remain constant. 
With this information, the realism of the assumption that 
there is an exclusive compensated substitut ion effect can be 
tested, by testing whether a significant relationship exists 
between tax rates and participation rates. The null 
hypothesis in this case being that the coefficient associated 
wi th taxes is less than zero. 
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c. The Empirical Model 
Pane l data for all fifty states over the period 198 8 to 
1990 were used for this study. When testing for correlation 
between tax rates and participation rates with these data, it 
is important to control for differences in populations that 
"a y change the shape and placement of the indifference set 
bet ween states. A number of social variables were tested; 
however, the most significant of these included the percentage 
o f manufacturing workers who are union members (PUMM); 
percentage of the states eligible population classified as 
black or hispanic (MIN) ; and percentage of the state 
population with four-year college degrees or more (EDUC) . 
Surprisingly, the percentage of the population over the age of 
65 was not significant over this period. 
The budget constraint was somewhat difficult to set up 
because asset income variables by state were not available. 
Also, all coefficients associated with real wage rates were 
insignificant. Therefore, it was decided that real median 
household income (MHI) should be used, because it incorporates 
both asset and wage income. Including MHI required that the 
study be limited to the period 1988 to 1990 because prev ious 
years of MHI are calculated differently and are not directly 
comparable. 
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Given that median household income, unemployment rates, 
a nd participation rates are simultaneously determined in the 
ma rket, fitted values of median household income and 
unemployment were first obtained through multivariate least 
squares to account also for correlation between the error 
terms. The set of exogenous variables that were used for both 
included eight dummy variables to represent the nine census 
regions; percentage of employment in the manufacturing, 
s ervice, and agricultural 
population over 65; EDUC; 
sectors; 
PUMM; 
percentage 
MIN; dummy 
of the 
v ariable 
designating whether the state is a right-to-work state; state 
employment ratio; state population; and the percentage of 
unemployed who are out of work for fifteen weeks or more. 
Both e s timations displayed a good fit: R2 • 86 for the 
unemployment equation; and R2 = .88 for the median household 
income equation. 
Effective tax rates were calculated from the tax burdens 
for a family of four with gross income of $25,000 for sales 
(STAX), property (PTAX), and income taxes (YTAX), for the 
largest city in each state. A composite of all of the above 
taxes, plus automobile licensing fees, was also tested (TAX) . 
Local option sales taxes were not included in the rates to 
allow for statewide comparison. Property tax burdens are 
difficult to extrapolate to a statewide comparison due to the 
fact that local government entities may each have a different 
property tax rate structure, <.nd that property tax burdens are 
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as much a function of property values as tax rates. 
Therefore, caution should be used when examining the impact 
due to property taxes. 
All data we re analyzed using TSP International, version 
4.2, which provided many advantages in that it automatically 
calculates fixed and random effect models. Each tax rate was 
included into the basic model individually in a separate run. 
As one might expect for this short time period, the fixed-
effects model, as opposed to the random-effects model, proved 
to be the appropriate specification in each case, as shown by 
the Hausman specification error test. The probability of 
error, given the chi-square distribution of the test, was 
always less than . 0001. Further, an F-statistic testing 
whether the intercepts for all states were equal showed that 
there was a significant difference between regular OLS 
estimates and the fixed effect estimates. The probability of 
error for the test was less than .0001 in all cases. 
D. Results 
The coeffic ients associated with all of the effective tax 
rates were insignificant at the .05 level. A separate 
analysis of the labor force participation rates of men and 
women were also performed using the same explanatory 
variables . There was no deviation from the results reported 
fo r the aggregate case. Estimated coefficients for all 
variables are shown in Table 2 below. 
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TABLE 2--ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OF FIXED-EFFECTS MODELS 
PREDICTING LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES AS A FUNCTION OF 
TAXES AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Model Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Dependent Variable: LFPR 
Income Tax MHIH .0000074 6.94 
(R2~. 59) UNH - .486 -4.97 
PUMM -2.21 -3.07 
MIN .158 2.69 
EDUC .2 46 2 . 02 
YTAX .530 1. 84 
Sales Tax MHIH .0000076 7.06 
(R2~.58) UNH - .457 -4.55 
PUMM -2.24 -3.08 
MIN .14 2.43 
EDUC .209 1. 54 
STAX 0 128 .85 
Property Tax MHIH .0000075 7.01 
(R2~.58) UNH - .479 -4.84 
PUMM -2.21 -3.03 
MIN .143 2.42 
EDUC .257 2 .09 
PTAX - .158 -1.13 
Total Tax MHIH .0000075 6.98 
(R2~. 58 ) UNH - .471 -4.73 
PUMM -2.27 -3.09 
MIN .147 2.47 
EDUC .256 2.01 
TAX .0046 .06 
E. Interpretation of Results 
The signs associated with each of the variables, with the 
exception of taxes, can be explained using some combinations 
of economic theory. One would expect that as median household 
income rises that the majority of the cause for that rise is 
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increasing wages , since most median households have very 
little asset income. This implies that the expected wage is 
rising relative to the reservation wage, which would then 
increase the participation rate. 
As discussed earlier, increasing unemployment rates 
dec r ease the expected wage toward the reservation wage, and 
thus the negative sign . Higher percentages of union 
membership being negatively correlated with participation 
rates is understandable due to the fact that union members 
have a higher probability of strikes and work stoppages, as 
we ll as layoffs in the manufacturing sector in general during 
this period, thus reducing the expected wage, causing the 
negative sign. 
The positive sign associated with larger minority 
populations can be explained if we assume that minority groups 
have extremely low or negative asset income on average, thus 
causing higher participation rates. The positive sign 
associated with education levels can be explained by 
acknowledging that persons with higher levels of education 
also have higher opportunity costs associated with leisure, 
and, higher wages. 
We can infer a number of things from the insignificance 
of all of the tax coeffic ients, including the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of this paper, that higher taxes are always 
correlated with a lower participation rate, after controlling 
for monetary income. From the results presented above, we can 
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infer that people do not perceive the public benefits provided 
at the state level, where public benefits are more visible as 
opposed to federal benefits, as transfer income. Quite the 
contrary, the signs of the tax coefficients for income, sales, 
a nd total, whi le insignificant, are positive rather than 
negat ive. The positive coefficient for the income tax is 
significant somewhere between the .05 and .10 levels, which 
suggests that there may be a dominant income or added-worker 
effect associated with higher state income taxes. If this is 
the case, then households are responding to higher levels of 
income taxation by supplying more workers to the market, 
presumably to maintain a given standard of living. 
F. Conclusions 
If all tax revenues are used to create government goods 
and services , but these goods and services are not a ll 
perceived by individuals as transfer income, the impact of 
taxes on market hours and participation rates becomes a 
function of income and substitution effects associated with 
changing expected wages, and income effects associated with 
c hanging asset income. This study does not support the notion 
that only a compensated substitution effect exists due to 
taxation. Rather, this research supports the research of 
Hausman and Ruud (1984) and Triest (1990), who found little or 
no connection between tax rates and labor supply. This 
research does, however, provide moderate support to the 
3 8 
a rgument that taxes may actually cause higher levels of 
pa rt ic ipa tion due to target income earning preferences o f 
hous e holds, which can be inferred from an added-worker effect 
(Lundberg , 1985). 
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Appendix (Chapter II) 
4 0 
All data related to wages, labor force participation, and 
empl o yment by sector were collected from Employment and Wages : 
An nual Averages or Geographic Pr ofile of Employment and 
Unemployment published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Ta x 
data were collected from the District of Columbia which 
c ompletes a yearly cross -sectional study of effective tax 
rates in a publication called Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the 
Distric t of Columbia : A Nationwide Comparison. Data for 
a ll remaining variables were collected from the Statistical 
Abstract of the United States . 
Eight dummy variables were created to represent nine 
regions in the first s tage estimation of median household 
income and unemployment. 
New England 
(REGl) 
Middle Atlantic 
(REG2) 
East North Cent . 
(REG3) 
These regions are defined as: 
Maine 
New Hampshire 
vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Michigan 
Wisconsin 
West North Cent. 
(REG4) 
South Atlantic 
(REG5) 
East So . Cent. 
(REG6) 
West So. Cent. 
(REG?) 
Mountain 
(REGS) 
Pacific 
Minnesota 
Iowa 
Missouri 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Nebraska 
Kansas 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Virginia 
w. Virginia 
N. carolina 
S . Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
Alabama 
Mississippi 
Arkansas 
Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Montana 
Idaho 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Arizona 
Utah 
Nevada 
Washington 
Oregon 
California 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION, 
SERVICE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND LABOR 
FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES 
Du r ing the 1980's, the service sector expanded rapidly, 
while manufacturing declined nationally. Regional 
unemployment rates soared in the so-called "Rust Belt" while 
se r vice and high-tech industries did a booming business on the 
East and West coasts. 
national problem, as 
increased. Stories 
Structural unemployment emerged as a 
the number of discouraged workers 
were reported by the press about 
ma nufacturing workers being laid off from their high-pay ing 
jobs, only to find another job in the service sector a t a much 
lower wage, sending the wife and kids into the labor force as 
well. 
The question is, to what extent do the data support all 
of this news? Thompson (1977) empirically verified that 
simultaneity exists between service sector employment labor 
force participation rates , with the former being positively 
correlated with the latter. Nord (1989) further explained the 
process by which service sector employment is correlated with 
participation rates. Nord argued that the linking variable is 
underemployment, and that households provide additional 
workers t o the market to mainta in a standard of liv ing. Nord 
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found a significant positive correlation between service 
sector employment and underemployment, as well as a positive 
relationship between participation rates and underemployment 
for the 100 largest SMSA's in 1980. These findings 
corroborate the story provided above. 
The purpose of this research is to theoretically show how 
the duration o f unemployment affects the participation 
decision, and to test whether additional persons enter the 
labor force as the duration of unemployment increases, as 
opposed to underemployment. A further test can then be 
performed to discover whether service-sector employment 
increases under these conditions using state-level panel data. 
We can develop some null hypotheses by evaluating an 
individual's market hours c hoices within a standard leisure-
consumption opportunities context. 
A. Theoretical Development of Null Hypotheses 
We must first begin by decomposing the factors that 
influence work hours. Work hours may be derived from a 
typical interdependent utility function where the ith 
individual within a household maximizes his or her utility : 
(l) 
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where 1; is leisure time, C; is the value of the indiv idual s 
c onsumption , and Ui is the utility of the jth person(s) in the 
household. Including the utility of the jth person forces 
interdependence of utility among family members. 
Optimal leisure, ma rket, and household production time 
c an be found by maximizing individual ut il ity in equation (1), 
subject to budget and time constraints 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
( 6) 
where T is total time available, T.w is market time, T*HP is 
time spent in household production of goods and services, 
noting that some of 1; and TiHP may be time spent jointly with 
other household members. 
Individual consumption, C;, is composed of purchased 
goods and services, X;, and the money value of goods and 
services produced by the household, Z;, where P is the price 
of consumer goods and services . The va lue of Z; is assumed to 
be equal to the opportunity costs (disposable wages forgone) 
associated with the hours spent on household production, Z;= 
W; 'T iHP ' where prime values indicate disposable wages and 
income. Disposable income, Yd, is pooled for the household 
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where S is household sav ing, and CPi is purchased consumption 
by the jth person(s). Wages for the ith and jth persons are 
W; and wi, transfers (public and private) are Y,,, and asset 
income is Y. . Asset income in time period t can be expressed 
as 
(7) 
where c. is consumption of weal th, which c an be assumed to be 
a function of unemployment, position in life-cycle, and 
dura tion of unemployment. The risk-free component of the 
interest rate (r) is typically determined by the Treasury when 
it issues short-term securities, and is therefore exogenous. 
The remainder of the interest rate is a function of the 
relative risk involved in the household asset portfolio. 
The time and money constraints can be expressed in a 
single full-income equation as 
(8) F-w~ l i +Pxi +w;TiHP+wjl i+Pxj+wjTjHP 
- (w; +wj) T+Y~. 
Where prime values are net of taxes, this implies that the 
expendi tures on goods and services plus expenditures on 
leisure plus the value of household production are equal to 
the total value of time for the ith and jth persons, plus non-
wage income. 
The system of equations provided above implies that 
market hours are a function of wages and the full income 
definition provided in ( 2) , so that Tiw = f (w; 1 , wi 1 , Yn 1 ) • The 
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Slutsky is derived directl y as a total differential of thi s 
expression 
( 9) 
which shows that the total change in market hours is composed 
of the own-wage compensated substitution effect plus the 
cross - wage compensated substitution effect, plus the full 
income effect (Keeley, 1981). Note that changes in the ith 
persons budget constraint due to an increase in the j th 
persons wage occur through private transfers in non-wage 
income . 
The problem at hand is to show how the duration of 
unemployment and the unemployment rate alter the budget 
constraint andj or the shape of the indifference surfaces, 
wh ich in turn alters both the reservation and expected wage 
rates. We can view the impact of the unemployment rate 
direct ly by assuming that the unemployment rate is the 
probability of not receiving a particular wage. Therefore, 
the expected wage for a representative individual can be 
wr itten as 
(10) E(w)-(1-UN) w, 
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vlhere the expected wage has some distribution derived from the 
wage available in the market . Another way in which 
unemployment can alter the budget constraint is through asset 
income . During periods of high unemployment we expect that 
macroeconomic adjustments will be made in the money market, 
causing the interest rate to fa ll, wh ich in turn will cause 
asset income to fall . Therefore , unemployment may affect the 
reservation wage, which can be simply expressed as 
(11) 
where the reservat i on wage is for a representative individua l, 
and therefore also has a distribution. 
In this example, we s ha ll as sume that transfers received 
during the recession do not fully replace losses in asset and 
wage income. This implies tha t bo th income and compensat ed 
substi tution effects wil l exist. 
Given that the participation rate can be expressed simply 
as a function of the reservat ion wage and the expected wage 
(12) LFPR-p (E( w), wr), 
the net impact of unemployment rates on participation rates 
depends on whether the spread between the reservation and 
expected wages has increased or decreased for this 
representativ e indiv idual. If the spread decreased, then 
obse r ved participation rates should fall, or vice versa. For 
the average household in the United States, which h as low 
levels o f asset income relative to wage incorre, we would 
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generally expect that unemployment will cause decreasing 
participation . 
As unemployment persists, households begin to consume 
their wealth. This causes non-wage income for jth persons to 
fall through the pooling of household income, which further 
reduces the reservation wage for all household members. It is 
likely that members within households will attempt to maintain 
the same level of utility in the face of increasing relative 
deprivation to a previous period, wh ich implies participation 
of the jth person(s). This leads to the very common notion 
that households use their labor as a hedge against risk and 
uncertainty related to income (Blau and Grossberg, 1991; 
Coyte, 1986; Gonul, 1989; Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990; Lundberg, 
1985; Seitchik, 1991; Tokle and Huffman, 1991 ) . 
From a household income perspective, then, if the 
probability of the ith person earning a real wage falls, then 
the probability of receiving total household wage income also 
falls, causing expected household wage income to fall. 
Ceteris paribus, this means that both the ith and jth persons 
move to a lower indifference curve where dw.'< 
I 
0 and 
(au j;aPxj) (aPxj;awi) < o. The only way around this problem is 
if the jth persons enter the labor market. 
From this discussion, the null hypotheses to be tested 
are 1) the duration of unemployment is positively correlated 
wi th labor force participation rates; 2) unemployment is 
negatively correlated with labor force participation rates; 
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and 3) service sector employment is negatively correlated with 
the duration of unempl oyment. These null hypotheses imply 
that the service sector is negatively affected by prolonged 
unemployment as are most other sectors of the economy and that 
the income effect is dominant as expected wages fall during 
pro longed periods of unemployment . 
B. The Empirical Model 
Pane l data for all fift y states over the period 1985 to 
1990 were used for thi s study. When testing for correlation 
between unemployment (UN) , duration of unemployment (DU), 
service sector employment (SERV) and participation rates 
(LFPR) with this data, it is important to control for 
diffe rences in populations that may change the shape a nd. 
placement of the indifference set between states. A number of 
social variables were tested; however, the most significa nt of 
these we re the percentage of the states eligible population 
c l assi fied as black or hispanic (MIN) ; the percentage of the 
s tate population with four - year college degrees or mor e 
(EDUC); and the percentage of the population over the age of 
65 (AGE). 
The budget constraint was somewhat difficult t o set up 
due to the fact that asset income variables by state were not 
ava ilable . Howeve r, average weekl y wages (RWAGE), per capita 
soc ial security payments (PCSS) , and average AFDC payments to 
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recipient households (AID) were used to represent the budget 
constraint. 
Given that unemp l oyment rates, wages, participation 
rates , AFDC payments, a nd Social Security payments are 
simultaneously determined in the market, fitted values of UN , 
AID, RWAGE , and PCSS were obtained through multivariate least 
squares to provide first-stage estimates and account for 
possible correlation between the error terms . The set of 
exogenous variables that was used for both included eight 
dummy va riables to represent the nine census regions; 
percentage of employment in the manufacturing, service, and 
agricultural sectors; AGE; EDUC; MIN; DU; percentage of 
ma nufacturing workers under union contracts; a dummy variable 
designating whether the s t a te is a right- to-work state; state 
employment ratio; state population; and five dummy variables 
representing the six-year period. All estimations provided a 
good fit: R2 = .86 for UNH; R2 = .76 for RWAGEH; R2 = .98 for 
PCSSH; and R2 = .95 for AIDH, where the "H" designates fitted 
variables. 
The model specification that was selected for final 
analysis was a fixed-effects model, based on the Hausma n 
specification error test, which overwhelmingly supported the 
fixed effect model with a probability of error of . 00001. 
Further, a comparison between the fixed-effect and standard 
OLS estimates was facilitated by a pseudo-F test, which 
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supported the fixed - effect model with a probability of error 
o f .00001 a s wel l. 
c. Results 
The empirical results fail to reject hypothesis one and 
two; however, we can reject hypothesis three using a separate 
eva luation of the direct relationship between DU and SERV. 
Table 3 below provides a summary of the results by variable. 
TABLE 3--LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF 
UN EMPLOYMENT AND DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Variable Coefficient 
Dependent Variable: LFPR 
PCSSH 
AIDH 
UNH 
DU 
RWAGEH 
EDUC 
AGE 
MIN 
.000041 
.00002 
-2.655 
. 232 
.00022 
.113 
-1.72 
. 138 
t-statistic 
3.02 
1. 04 
- 26.13 
18.76 
2.40 
1. 39 
- 7 . 36 
5.29 
R2 = . 84 (includes dummy variables for year) 
A separate fixed-effects model testing the third 
hypothesis regarding the correlation between service sector 
employment and the duration of unemployment was created with 
DU as the independent variable and UNH, SERV, and the change 
in the fitted wage (DRWAGE) as explanatory variables. Results 
are presented in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4--DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A FUNCTION OF 
SERV, UNH, AND DRWAGE 
Var i ab l e coefficient t-statistic 
Depend ent Variable: DU 
SERV 
UN H 
DRWAG EH 
1. 200 
3.71 
- . 00257 
4.13 
11.61 
- 4.88 
D. Interpretation of Results 
53 
All of the signs associated with each o~ the variables 
ca n be explained using the model presented earlier. One would 
e xpect that, controlling for age, unemployment, and duration 
o f unemployment, increasing Social Security payments cause 
non-wage income, and therefore the reservation wage, to rise. 
Increasing wages c reate a positive incentiv e t o 
pa rti c ipate in the market, as long as reservation wages are 
r ising more slowly than wages. Hence the positive sign 
a ssociated with wages. The AID coefficient is insignificant, 
a nd requires no further explanation. 
As discussed earlier, increasing unemployment rates 
de c rea se the expected wage toward the reservation wage, and 
thus the negative sign. The positive sign associated with 
larger minority populations can be explained if we assume that 
minority groups have extremely low asset income on average, 
thus c ausing higher participation rates. The positive sign 
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a ssociated with education levels can be explained by 
acknowledging that persons with higher levels of education 
also ha v e higher opportunity c osts associated with leisure, 
a nd, higher wages . Also, the negative sign associated with 
AGE means that when people approach retirement, they generally 
leave the labor force . 
The variable of primary interest in Table 3 is DU. These 
results provide strong evidence supporting the added-worker 
effe c t as was discussed earlier. Given this information, 
households appear to have a significant desire to maintain 
s tandards of living. Comparing the size of the coefficients 
a nd t-statistics associated with UNH and DU, however, one 
c ould imply that the added-worker effect is overwhelmed by the 
discouraged worker effect . 
Separate analysis of the participation rates of men and 
women was performed using the explanatory variables listed 
above. In both cases, significant positive coefficients 
a ssociated with the duration of unemployment were found whi l e 
s ignificant negative coefficients were generated for the 
unemployment rate, as was found in the aggregated case. This 
i mplies that men and women are affected in the same way by the 
duration of unemployment and the unemployment rate. The DU 
c oefficient for women was .23 ( t=9 . 19), and the DU coefficient 
for men was . 20 (t=S.O). We can conclude from these results 
that women are no longer the primary source of secondary 
workers that lead to the added-worker effect. 
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The coefficients presented in Table 4 suggest that the 
s ervice sector growth is correlated with longer periods of 
unemployment, which in turn are associated with higher rates 
o f participation. The primary explanation for this 
relationship is that higher participation rates are necessary 
to maintain family incomes in an environment of declining 
ma nufacturing and an expanding service sector, due to the 
l ower wages paid in the service sector . This is the same 
result that was found by Nord in 1989, using 1980 data . 
The policy implications of this result are that if 
ma nufactur i ng in the United States continues to fall, more 
persons will be required to enter the market to maintain a 
giv en standard of living. Clearly, this situation will cause 
a net welfare loss to society if household production of goods 
a nd leisure time are both reduced, unless household goods are 
replaced by purchased goods of equal value and the time 
intensity of leisure falls (Becker, 1965). If the last two 
c onditions cannot be met, which is very likely, then it is 
clear that a national economic policy that targets industrial 
growth is justified. 
E. summary 
This research shows that a signi_ficant income or added 
worker effect exists as the duration of unemployment 
increases. Although this effect exists, it is overwhelmed by 
a dumirant substitution or discouraged worker effect. A 
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possible link is made between labor force participation rates 
and service sector employment through the duration of 
unemployment . Service sector employment is shown to be 
positively correlated with the duration of unemployment, which 
in turn is positively correlated with labor force 
participation. 
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Appendix (Chapter III) 
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All data related to wages, labor force participation, and 
employment by sector were collected from Employment and Wages: 
Annual Averages or Geographic Profile of Employment and 
Unemployment published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Data for all remaining variables were collected from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Eight dummy variables were created to represent nine 
regions in the firs t stage estimation of median household 
income and unemployment. 
New England 
(REGl) 
Middle Atlantic 
(REG2) 
East North Cent. 
(REG3) 
West North Cent. 
(REG4) 
These regions are defined as: 
Maine 
New Hampshire 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 
New York 
New Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Michigan 
Wisconsin 
Minnesota 
Iowa 
Missouri 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
Nebraska 
Kansas 
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South At lantic Delaware 
(REG5) Maryland 
Virginia 
w. Virginia 
N. carolina 
s . Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
East So. Cent. Kentucky 
(REG6) Tennessee 
Alabama 
Mississippi 
West So. Cent. Arkansas 
(REG7) Louisiana 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Mountain Montana 
(REGS) Idaho 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
New Mexico 
Arizona 
Utah 
Nevada 
Pacific Washington 
Oregon 
California 
Al aska 
Hawaii 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES 
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To what extent, if any, does household size affect the 
labor force participation decisions of men and women in 
contemporary times? Becker (1965) argues that the allocation 
of time of any individual in a household depends on one ' s own 
opportunities and the opportunities of other household 
members. Over the past twenty-five years or so, the market 
opportunities and returns to women have greatly expanded . One 
could hypothesize, then, that decreasing household si ze in the 
Un ited States is due in part to the increasing opportunity 
costs associated with child bearing. 
A further argument could be made that household size is 
p rimarily responsible for the demand for household goods and 
se r vices, from which we can derive the demand for time spent 
in household production. The purpose of this research is to 
test the hypotheses that : 1) increasing real wages are 
negatively correlated with birth rates; 2) household size is 
negatively correlated with participation rates for both men 
and women; and 3) that no difference exists between the impact 
of household on men's and women's labor force participation 
decisions. 
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A. Theoretical Development of the Null Hypotheses 
The impact of household size andjor fertility on the 
leisure-market hours trade-off can be shown by maximizing a 
standard interdependent utility function, where consumption 
includes purchased and domestically produced goods and 
services which are a function of time spent in production of 
household goods. The connecting assumption to be tested is 
that time spent in production of household goods is positively 
related with household size, thus causing the participation 
rate to fall as household size increases. 
The basic problem is to maximize an individual's utility 
( 1) 
where l; is .leisure time, C; is the value of the individual's 
consumption, and Ui is the utility of the jth person(s) in the 
household. Including the utility of the jth person forces 
interdependence of utility between family members. 
Leisure time within the utility function is simply 
defined as: 
(2) 
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where T is total time available, T. is time spent in wage 
ea rning, and T i~ is time spent in individual non-wage 
production of household goods and services, noting that some 
of l i and TiHP may be time spent jointly with other household 
members . 
Individual consumption, Ci, is composed of purchased 
goods and services, xi, and the money value of goods and 
services produced by the household, Zi. 
be expressed as: 
(3) 
The value of ci can 
where P is the price of consumer goods and services. The 
value of Zi is assumed to be equal to the opportunity costs 
(disposable wages forgone) associated with the hours spent on 
household production, Zi= wi 'T i ~' where prime values indicate 
disposable wages and income . The value of household 
production of goods and services can be expressed as: 
( 4) 
which implies that z = zi + zj. 
A production constraint is imposed on (4) through the 
time identity in ( 2) . A budget constraint is imposed on 
consumption of x i in that 
(5) 
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where Yd is the disposable income of the household, S is 
household saving, and Cpj is purchased consumption by the jth 
person(s) . 
The time constraint is directly tied to a budget 
constraint 
( 6) 
where disposable household income depends directly on the time 
allocated to market hours by the i th and j th persons, the 
respective wages of these persons (wi and wj), transfers (Y,r ), 
asset income (Y
0
) and taxes (Keeley, 1981) . Through the 
optimization process, optimal market, household production, 
and leisure hours are jointly determined. We can break the 
problem down to the very simple expression Ti HP• = T - (l i• + 
Ti;) where T is fixed. 
The demand for time in any of these three categories is 
derived from the variables in the utility function. Given the 
primary interests of this research, the utility of the jth 
individual, and the market hours of the jth person are of key 
importance. If the number of j persons increases in the 
household, then the number of hours spent caring for these 
persons will likely rise. This assumes that the time 
intensity of family care, which may or may not be linear over 
some range of j persons, is always positive. The need to 
allocate additional hours to household production will reduce 
optimal leisure andjor market time due to the finite nature of 
time. If the ith person reduces market time, then purchased 
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consumption for all persons in the household will fall, 
assuming that households pool all income. 
On the other hand, if the ith person reduces individual 
leisure, t hen the utility of all persons in the household wi ll 
fall due to the interdependence of utility functions. 
Therefore, whether increasing household size causes decreases 
or increases in market hours and participation by one or all 
eligible persons in the household depends on the relative 
magn itude of the coefficients associated with leisure, 
consumption, and Uj. 
If there are diminishing returns associated with each of 
these activities, then increasing household size increases 
competi tion for consumption goods, which increases the 
margina l utility of purchased consumption for each individual. 
This same process causes the marginal utility of all time uses 
to increase, although by possibly different rates. The 
activity which will ultimately receive more time is the one 
with the highest marginal utility, which implies t hat one or 
both of the competing uses will receive less. 
We can present these opposing effects of increasing 
household size graphically by assuming that T', the amount of 
time to be allocated between the market and leisure in a 
typical consumption-leisure model, falls to T" due to 
increasing T,.; If this occurs, then the reservation wage 
will rise, causing participation rates to fall for any given 
level of non-wage income and expected wage, assuming a fixed 
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se t o f indifference curves. This effect is shown in Figure 6. 
A countering effect occurs because the marginal utility 
o f consumption has increased over the entire range of possible 
consumption opportunities . This causes the indifference curve 
to flatten out, thus lowering the reservation wage and 
i nc reasing participation, assuming that the marginal utility 
of leisure rises by less than the marginal utility of 
consumption. This adjustment in the indifference set a lso 
a ssumes that all non-earned income in the family is pooled and 
unc ha nging. This effec t is shown in Figure 7. Both Figures 
6 a nd 7 a ssume constant time intensities for leisure and work 
to finance consumption. 
C=f (Y) 
------
-----
-------
--------------------------
Marke t Hours ] T" T' 
FIGURE 6 . IMPACT ON THE RESERVATION WAGE DUE TO 
INCREASING DEMAND FOR HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION 
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C=f(y 
Wr 
-~~::1~=~=::::::::::::::::::~~~~:::::::==::========----======---"·----
FIGURE 7. CHANGE IN THE RESERVATION WAGE DUE TO 
INCREASING MARGINAL UTILITY OF CONSUMPTION 
B. The Empirical Model 
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0 
We can test the first hypothesis in a straightforward 
manner , by explaining live births per 1000 population (BIRTH) 
as a functio n of real wages and other variables which capture 
social variations between states . Several variables were 
tested ; however , the most significant of these were the 
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percentage of the popu l a tion classified as hispanic andjor 
black (MIN) , and percentage of the population over the age of 
65 (AGE) . 
Panel data from all 50 s t a tes over the period 1985 to 
1989 were used to test this hypothesis. A random-effects 
mode l was selected on the basis of a Hausman specification 
error test which showed that the fixed-effects model ha d a 
probability of specificat i o n error of .069, given a ch i-square 
of 7 .08, df= J . 
We can test whether marg inal utility of purc hased 
consumpt ion is greater-tha n or less-than the marginal utility 
of increasing household production as j increases, the second 
hypothesis, by evaluating the relationship between household 
size and the labor force participation rate, assuming that the 
marg inal utility of leisure is constant. To do this, we must 
firs t dev elop a basic model of labor force participation. The 
first assumption is that the reservation wage is a function of 
ave rage non-wage income, which can be simply defined as the 
average transfer payment plus average asset income. 
Further, the expected wage for the representative 
individual is the average wage, conditioned by the probability 
of receiving that wage. The probability of receiving a given 
wage can be defined as one minus the unemployment rate. The 
discussion above assumes that the indifference set remains 
constant in shape and placement. 
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We can write the structural model as 
(7) LFPR-p( E (w) , wr), 
(8) E ( w) - ( 1- UN) w, 
(9) wr-r ( Y C' Y.) . 
Given that this model is for a representative (average) 
individual, there exists a distribution around both the 
reservation and expected wages. Therefo re, as these mean 
values start to converge, we would expect to observe greater 
overlap in their respective distributions, thus causing 
observed aggregate participation rates to fall. 
Cross-section data for all fifty states in 1990 were used 
to test the second and third hypotheses. Panel data were not 
used due to the fact that accurate household size data are 
only available through the decennial census. It was decided 
that using the birth rate as a proxy for household size would 
not be appropriate as household size is determined by several 
factors not captured by the birth rate. 
When testing for correlation between participation rates 
(LFPR) and household size (HHS) with these data, it is 
important to control for variations in income and other social 
differences between states. 
The budget constraint was somewhat difficult to set up 
due to the fact that asset income variables by state were not 
available. Therefore, median household income (MHI) was used 
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on the assumption that it captures variations in all forms of 
i ncome. 
Given that unemployment rates, participation rates, and 
median household income are simultaneously determined in the 
market, fitted values of UN and MHI must be obtained to avoid 
simultaneity bias. The set of instruments that were used to 
estimate this two-stage least-squares model included the 
percentage of employment in the manufacturing, service, and 
agricultura l sectors; percentage of the population over age 
65; percentage of the population with four-year college 
degrees or more; percentage of the population identified as 
black and/or hispanic; percent age of manufacturing workers 
under union contracts; a dummy variable designating whether 
the state is a right-to-work state; state employment ratio; 
and state population. The AGE variable was also included in 
the estimated structural equation due to its significant 
explanatory power. 
c. Results 
The empirical results fail to reject the hypothesis that 
BIRTH is negatively correlated with real wage rates. This 
result supports the time allocation theories forwarded by 
Becker (1965), which include the general argument that the 
real wage represents the opportunity cost of time spent in 
rearing children. The results of the random-effects model are 
provided below in Table 5. 
TABLE 5--LIVE BIRTHS PER 1000 AS A FUNCTION OF 
REAL WAGES AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Variable Coefficient 
Dependent Variable: BIRTH 
RWAGE 
MIN 
AGE 
c 
R2 = • 30 
e = .o4 
.00431 
2.513 
-63.693 
24.51 
t-statistic 
- 3.02 
1. 69 
- 9.53 
24.99 
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Empirical analysis fails to reject the second hypothesis, 
that a negative relationship exists between household size and 
participation rates, but only for combined and female 
participation rates. In both of these cases a significant 
negative relationship exists between household size and the 
participation rate. No significant relationship exists, 
however, between household size and male participation rates, 
which allows us to reject the third hypothesis that the HHS 
impacts on men and women are equal. Results of the combined, 
male, and female models are presented as Tables 6, 7, and 8 
below. 
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TABLE 6--COMBINED LABOR FORCE PART ICIPAT I ON AS A FUNCTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Va riable Coefficient 
Dependent Var iable: LFPR 
MHI 
UN 
AGE 
HHS 
c 
R2 = . 45 
F- statistic 
. 0000024 
-3.047 
- . 907 
- .117 
1. 18 
15.68 
t-statistic 
2 .16 
- 5.25 
- 3.36 
- 2 . 7 1 
7.78 
TABLE 7 --MALE LABOR FORCE PARTIC IPATION AS A FUNCTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Variable Coefficient 
Dependent Variable: LFPRM 
MHI 
UN 
AGE 
HHS 
c 
.0000013 
-2.60 
- . 859 
- .066 
1.14 
R2 = . 28 
F-statistic 7 .05 
t-statistic 
.33 
- 3.61 
- 2.56 
- 1.23 
6.04 
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TABLE 8--FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AS A FUNCTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND OTHER VARIABLES 
Va riable Coefficient 
Dependent Variable: LFPRF 
MHI 
UN 
AGE 
HHS 
c 
R2 = . 46 
F-statistic 
.000003 
-3.39 
- .99 
- .152 
1. 20 
15.21 
t-statistic 
2.34 
- 5.06 
- 3.16 
- 3.06 
6.86 
D. Interpretation of Results 
A significant negative relationship exists between real 
wages and fertili t y, accounting for variations between states. 
These results support the relationship predicted by Becker 
( 19 65 ), and Layard and Mincer (1985), that increasing wage 
rates provide a disincentive for having additional children. 
Given this information, we can explain that decreasing 
household size is due in part to increasing real wage 
opportunities for women. 
The results presented above also show that while a 
negat ive correlation between household size and labor force 
partic ipation exists for women, no significant relationship 
between these variables exists for men. This information 
supports the continuing existence of traditional roles of men 
and women in the family. It is also interesting to note that 
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household income is also insignificantly correlated with male 
participation rates, which further supports the notion of the 
"traditiona l" male role of market participation, regardless of 
the domestic situation. 
Additional information that can be extracted from these 
results includes the fact that a positive relationship exists 
between female participation and household income. We cannot 
discover anything about the direction of causality given the 
cross-sectional nature of the data. However, theory suggests 
that the appropriate explanation is that as women enter the 
labor force, household income rises. If women entered the 
labor force due to increasing income, this would imply that 
increasing non-wage income, which increases the reservation 
wage, increases the probability of female participation. 
Cl early, this is not logical. 
E. summary 
The findings of this research show that while household 
size is negatively correlated with labor force participation 
rates for women, no such relationship exists for men. These 
findings support the notion that traditional sex roles 
continue to exist in households. Real wage rates are 
negatively correlated with the number of live births per 1000 
during the period 1985 to 1989 among the fifty states. This 
suggests that real wages represent an opportunity cost of 
• bearing children. 
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Appendix (Chapter IV) 
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All data related to wages , labor force participation, and 
employment by sector were collected from Employment and Wages : 
Annual Averages or Geographic Profile of Employment and 
Unemployment published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Tax 
data were collected from the District of Columbia which 
completes a yearly cross-sectional study of effective tax 
rates in a publication called Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the 
District of Columbia: A Nationwide Comparison. The number of 
live births per 1000 population, by state of residence were 
collected from Vital Statistics of the United States, wh ich is 
published by the U. S. National Center for Health Statistics. 
Household Income Data are from Current Population Reports, 
series P-60, Number 174. Household size data are from the 
1992 Statistical Abstract of the United States , table 60. 
Data for all remaining variables were collected from the 
Statistica l Abstract of the United States. 
REFERENCES 
Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," 
The Economic Journal, September 1965, 493-517. 
Keeley, Michael c., Labor Supply and Public Policy: A 
Critical Review, New York : Academic Press, 1981. 
Layard, R. and Mincer, J. "Trends in Women's Work, 
Education, and Family Building." Journal of Labor 
Economics, January, 1985. 
79 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
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This research has shown that labor force participation 
rates among the fifty states are not significantly correlated 
with any measure of state taxes, including an aggregate tax 
burden, income taxes, sales taxes or property taxes. This 
result is contrary to the view that taxes will only cause a 
compensated substitution effect in the aggregate, which, if 
correct, would have yielded negative coefficients with respect 
to taxes. This research found that no significant difference 
exists between the tax effects on female or male participation 
decisions. 
This research also found that the duration of 
unemployment is positively correlated with labor force 
participation rates while the unemployment rate is negatively 
correlated. A link between participation rates, duration of 
unemployment, and service sector growth was made, showing a 
positive correlation between all three variables. Once again, 
no significant difference was found between men's and women's 
responses to these variables. 
Additional findings of this research are that household 
size is significantly correlated with the labor force 
participation rate in the negative direction for women, 
although no such relationship exists for men. Real wages were 
81 
found to be negatively related with live births per 1000 
populat i on . 
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